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This paper studies the optimal use of distortivepolicies aimed at
raising a given real revenue, in a general equilibrium framework inwhich
lump—suni taxes are absent, The policies analyzed are an inflationtax,
commercial policy, and an implicit tax on capital inflowsimplemented by
capital controls. It is shown that we would tend to avoidactivating an
inflation tax for small revenue needs. Furthermore, if thepolicy target were
allocative, we would tend to use only one policy instrument.Thus, each
policy has its own comparative advantage, and their combineduse is justified
when the target is raising government revenue. Asa by-product of the paper,
we study the determinants of exchange rates, prices, andquantities in an
economy subject to capital controls and commercial policy.
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1. Introduction
Open economies frequently restrict trade in goods and assets, and
occasionally follow inflationary policies. As is well known, such policies
are inefficient for small economies, provided that they find lump—sum policies
feasible. Thus, the frequent application of distortive policiessuggests that
lump-sum policies are not feasible. The purpose of this paper is to evaluate
the implications of the absence of lump-sum policies for thecomplementarity
of distortive policies used as a means of raising governmentrevenue, In the
absence of lump-sum taxes the policy maker should attempt to use anoptimal
mixture of other taxes in an attempt to raise a given revenue at the lowest
possible social cost. Identifying that mixture will generate predictions
regarding the optimal associations between distortive policies and the size of
government revenue. This paper solves this problem for a small openeconomy
in which commercial policies, capital controls, and an inflation taxare the
feasible means of raising revenue.1 It applies general equilibriumanalysis
for the case in which cash balances are needed to facilitate theexchange of
goods, and capital controls introduce a wedge between domestic and foreign
rates of' return. The analysis proceeds by deriving a welfare measure for a
marginal change in the policies and in government revenue. Such a measure
implies that whenever the revenue requirements of the government are small, we
would not impose an inflation tax. This reflects the fact that equilibrium
with zero government revenue is distorted due to the lack of appropriate
interest payments in the money market, whereas all other markets are free from
distortions. Thus, at the margin, raising government revenue by tariffs or
capital controls would be associated with a small deadweight loss relative to-2-
the use of an inflation tax. An increasein revenue needs would be associated
with a greater use of restrictive tradeand capital control policies,
consequently raising the marginal deadweightloss At some stage, however,
the resultant distortion would equatethe marginal deadweight losses caused by
using either tariffs or capitalcontrols or an inflation tax as alternative
means of revenue sources. Thus, afurther expansion in government demand
would be associated with the simultaneous useof an inflation tax and other
distortive policies. Although the discussiondoes not include such
alternative policies as a labor tax, it canbe readily extended to cover a
broader policy spectrum without alteringthe main results.
To focus on issues related to financing governmentactivity, the paper
considers a perfect foresight model. Thus,it neglects the potential
motivation for applying restrictive policiesin order to affect the degree of
exposure of domestic agents anddomestic policies to foreign unanticipated
shocks. •To formulate the ipflation tax, we assumea flexible exchange rate
system (a similar analysis can beconducted for a gliding parities system).
Capital controls are modeled in thecontext of' a modified dual exchange rate,
under which the controls generate a wedgebetween the exchange rates applied
for current and capital account transactions.An alternative interpretation
of capital controls would be as a policy of imposinga tax on purchases of
foreign assets. Commercial policy ismodeled as a tariff. While the details
of the analysis are model-specific, its main
conclusion should be robust: the
absence of lump—sum taxes generates complementaritYbetween the various
distortive policies applied to generate a given governmentrevenue at the
lowest welfare cost. The nature of this complementaritYwill depend, however,
upon both the magnitude of governmentrevenue needs and the structure of the
economy.
The paper specializes the discussion by considering aspecific utility—3-.
function. This allows us to find the closed—form solution of allprices and
quantities and thus to assess the effects of capital controls and tariffs on
both the exchange rate and on the wedge between the exchange ratesapplied for
vrious transactions. One can use this framework to assess the desired
combination of policies to be implemented to achieve specific targets. The
paper demonstrates that if the target is to reduce consumption of imports
only, a tariff policy should be implemented, whereas if the target is to
change the intertemporal allocation of consumption, only capital controls
should be implemented. Thus, each policy has its own comparativeadvantege,
and their combined use is justified when the target is raisinggovernment
revenue.
The plan of the paper is to introduce in section 2 the problem for the
case of a general periods separable utility, deriving the welfare measure for
marginal policy and revenue changes. Section 3 specializes the discussion for
a specific utility, deriving closed-form solutions for all prices and all
quantities. Section 14 applies the model to derive optimal policies to be
implemented for the attainment of specific targets. Appendix A provides the
detailed derivation of some of the steps in section 2, and appendix B
summarizes the notation applied in the paper.
2. The Model
Let us consider the minimal framework needed to obtain a measure of the
welfare cost associated with raising government revenue using eithertariffs,
capital controls, or an inflation tax. For a tariff, we consider a model with
two goods, exportables and importables. For capital controls, weassume the
existence of a traded bond, whose domestic trade might be subject to
restrictions. For intertemporal considerations needed to generate a demand
for the bond, and the opportunity cost of holding money, we should consider at
a minimum a two-period model. To simplify notation we take the case of_l4.
exactly two periods, present andfuture. The model can be readily extended
into k periods analysis without altering
the logic of our discussion.
It is widely appreciated that theintroduction of money into a general
equilibrium model is not a trivialmatter. The presumption made in this paper
is that the money provides services by reducingthe cost of exchanging
goods. The use of real balances promotesmore efficient exchange and in so
doing saves costly resources. Those
resources might include time and capital,
which would be used to coordinate varioustransactiofls2 To simplify
exposition, the paper studies the casein which the exchange activity is time
intensive. A possible way of capturing thisnotion is by assuming that
leisure is a decreasing function of the velocityof circulation. That is
because a drop in the velocity of circulationis associated with a higher
intensity of money use per transction, allowing
one to save on the use of time
in facilitating transactions, thereby increasing1eisure3 Thus, if leisure
is denoted by L and velocity by v, we assume
(1) L L(v) L, <
0
where i stands for the time subscript.The utility of.a typical consumer is
given by:




Xand denote consumption of good x and good yin period i. '
standsfor the subjective discount factor. denotes money balances used in
period i. X is identified as exportables; Yas importables. There
exists a traded bond, B, denominated interms of good y, paying real
interest rate r*. Denoting by
"i"foreignvalues, the international price
of the bond in period 0 is P0, and it pays P1(1
+r*)next period(in foreign currency terms). We allow for the presence of capital controls
and tariff revenue in period zero. Denoting by t the tariff rate, andby
et the exchange rate applied for commercial transactions, we find that





(14) P (1 ÷ t)e P (1 +t)P' y,o 0 y,o y,o
*
where the domestic, before—tariff price of Yis P' e P .The ) 0 y,ooy,o
presence of capital controls might cause the domestic price of traded bonds to
diverge from their value as obtained by applying the commercial exchange
rate. Let us denote the domestic price of the traded bonds as
*
(5) fe P fP'
o y,o y,o
f 1is the wedge between the exchange rate relevant to financial
transactions and the exchange rate for commercial transactions. We assume an
endowment model, in which our consumer is endowed with X.units of good X
in period '-. denotesinitial money balances. The budget constraint in
period 0 is given by:
(6) PX +(1+t)P'Y +M+fP'B x,oo y,oo o y,o
P ÷R x,000
To simplify exposition, we assume zero initial holdings of traded bonds.
Initial endowment is used to finance consumption and changes in the assets
position. In the next period our consumer is facing a budget constraint given
by:
(7) PX +PY +MM +P X ÷(1+r*)BP
x,1 1 y,l 1 10 x,1 1 y,l—6—
Our consumer finances consumption and the useof money balances from his
initial endowment in period one. This endowmentincludes money balances
carried over from period zero, endowment of good X,and the income paid on
the traded bonds held from period zero. Equation7 reflects the assumption
that all restrictive policies are applied in periodzero.5 Because period 1
is the "end" of our consumer's horizon, he doesnot purchase new bonds to
carry wealth into the future.In a general k periods model we will find
that a typical budget constraint in period n< k will look like equation 6,
and only the terminal period budget constraintwill look like equation 7.As
k ÷, therelevance of period k lies only in generating thetranversality
condition equating the consumption net present valueto the endowment net
present value. Our model can be readilyextended for a general k, without
altering the main results.
We denote by the discount factor that is applied for discounting
nominal units from period one to period zero. The presenceof the traded bond
permits the trading of the purchasing powerof +r*)in terms of







Denoting by I the money expenditure in period
i
(I.X. P .+ Y.P.) ,wecan collapse equations 6 and 7 into a unique
1X,1 1 y,1
intertemporal budget constraint.
(9) I + I P X +cPX +M— M (1 — — Hc
o 1x,00 x,11oo 1
Met present value of consumption is equal to net presentvalue of the
endowment (the first three terms on the right-hand side) adjusted bythe
opportunity cost of using money balances in period zero,M(1 — c), and theterminal level of money balances.
The government has three revenue sources: an inflation tax, tariffs, and
revenue from sales of foreign bonds at a premium. The revenue is used to
finance governmental activities. We assume that the authorities effectively
control trade in bonds. Agents can trade those bonds among themselves freely,
but they can make transactions with foreign agents only via the financial
authorities, which control the quantity of traded bonds sold to domestic
agents.6 Thus, capital control takes the form of quantity control, which
manifests itself in the premium f -1.This premium is market determined,
corresponding to B. A net sale of B bonds by the authorities in period 0
will generate revenue of f P0B. The cost for the authorities of purchasing
the bonds is given by P,QB. The net income from the wedge
(f -1)generated by the controls is (1' —
1)P,0B.
Notice that the same
outcome would occur if the authorities imposed a tax at a rate of
(f -1)on capital inflows, allowing quantities to be market determined.8
Thus, in the absence of uncertainty, one can view the capital controls defined
in the paper as a policy that sets a quota B, under which the government
collects the quota rents, or alternatively as a policy that sets a tax
f —1on capital inflows. In the first case, prices are market determined;
in the second, quantities. As in the case of commercial policy, the
equivalence between the two policies would break down in the presence of
uncertainty.
The net government revenue in periods zero and one is given by
(10) (H —M)÷tY P'+(f—1)BP' 00 0 y,o y,o
(lOa) M1 -M
The first term in equatins (10) and (lOa) is the seigniorage, the second
and third terms in equation 10 are, respectively, the tariff revenue, and the-8-
revenue raised by the implicit tax on capital mobility
The authorities are free to make transactions inthe international market
without restrictions. Thus, the discount factorrelevant for them is:
I11\ I —Y' —
C—
p (1 + r*)
—£
y,1
The net present value of government revenue is therefore given by:
(12) G M —M+ t Y P'+ Cf—1)BP'
0 0 0 y,O y,0
+ (M1 -M0)
C'
It is useful to evaluate government revenue in real terms Using X0as
the numerare we find that
M -M





whereq =P•/*denotesthe external terms of trade in period i.
1 y,1 X,1
The result of the restrictive policies is to introducevarious
distortions, and thus to blur the underlying intertemporal budget
constraint. In this connection it is useful to evaluate all budget
constraints in real terms, using international, distortion-free prices.For
example, by dividing equation 9 by xo the private budgetconstraint can be
rewritten as
P H -M (H -H)
(1k) X0 + (1 + t)Y0q+
C + Cx11 +
°+ 0 1
x,o x,o x,o x,o
In order to derive the final budget constraint, it is usefulto—9-P
decompose into
(f 1)P' y,o y,o (15) C
Pi(1 +r*)
+
p (1 ÷r*) y,1 y,
Plugging this result into equation 14,collectingterms we find that
(16) X +(1+t)Yq* + 0[1 ° 1+r* Lq* Xl
+
+ ____q* M M q*(M -M)
10— 0 000 1
1+r q 1 P
x,o y,1
(f1)PI ÷M —H —P X
—
1+r*
y,o 1 1 0x,1
ij P
y,1 x,o
Fromequation 7we find that
(7') I + K—PX z1+r*)Bp 0 11 y,1
Folding (7') into equation 16 yields
q*




o 1 +r*q* 1 P
+
(1+r*)P+ (f-1)q*B +tY q*J 0 00 1 x,o y,1
Notice that the last term in equation 18 is equal to the net present
valueof real government revenue. Thus:
q* q* (18)X +Yq* +*(1
°
r [X1+ q Y1] + g zX+
1 0 o 1+r*q X1. o ooq
Equation18 is the fundamental intertemporal budget constraint. Net-10-.
present value of private plus publicconsumption equals to the net present
value of the endowment, where both areevaluated using distortion—free,
international prices.
The private budget constraint is given by equation 9,which takes
government policies as given. Private agentsmaximize their utility subject
to this constraint. For the resultant optimalbehavior of the private sector
the fundamental budget constraint, given by equation18, implies the
corresponding government revenue. Government policyis summarized by the
vector CM0, H1, B, t). For a given goverment policythe corresponding
revenue g is a function of both the pricesand quantities set by the private
agents' behavior. Let (M0, H1, B, t) be theresultant revenue
corresponding to a utility level of private agents givenby U(M0, M1, B, t).
The problem facing the government is to choose policiesthat will maximize
private sector welfare subject to a givenreal revenue target (g0):
(19) Max U
(M0, M1, B, t)
s.t. gg0
Because our system is homogeneous, real revenueand real equilibrium will
not be affected by an anticipated equa-proportioflrise in (M1, M0). To fix
ideas, consider the case in which the valueof M0 is given (M0= ) ,and
the government sets H1. In such a case moneybalances will increase by
H1 -Min period 1. The increase is implemented by financing partof
government purchases of goods and services by issuingnew money. Thus, the
solution to the government's problem, as describedin equation 19, is reduced
to a choice of (M1, B, t). For a given, known governemntpolicy, private
agents maximize utility U subject to equation9, resulting in the following
first-order conditions:(20)
where
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Although prices are exogenously given
prices would affect welfare via its direct












Ux x,1 Ux y,1
0 0
to each agent, a change in the
effect on velocity and indirect
2 reveals that
10 '1 3U (20') U z-u ;U c—pu—;andU
v0 (M )2 K1 v1 (M )2 z z
0 1
for any variable z, and Ais the budget constraint multiplier.
To gain further insight into the government's problem, considera
marginal change in the vector of government policies,A (M1, B, t). Such a
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It is useful to apply the first-order conditions (equation20, 20') into
equations 21, 22 in order to derive the welfare changein terms of observable
variables. We can simplify further by using the various budgetconstraints.
The details of this lengthy process are given in Appendix A,where it is shown
that the final approximation of the marginal welfare changearound initial











) X,O(p )yO;s x p Il ; s ÷s 1
ax,o y,o . x,oo x,o0x,oy,o
correspondsto the price level in period 0, defined as a weighted
average of goods prices, the weights beingthe expenditure share. 11'is the
inflation in terms of good y (defined using the price netof tariff), and
is real balances in period zero.
Equation 23 is the key step in our present discussion.It describes the
net welfare effect of raising government revenue Ag by a corresponding
marginal change in policies A (H1, B, t). It canbe decomposed in terms
involving the marginal deadweight loss in the threedistorted activities
induced by the change in policies (the first three terms),minus a term that
corresponds to the direct income effect induced by transferring Ag—13-
resources. The deadweight loss in each activity equals the change in the
relevant activity times the distortion (given in the bracket of the first
three terms). Those distortions are proportional to the tariff rate, the
premium in the assets market (f —1)induced by capital controls, and the
nominal interest rates, when the factors of proportionality convert the
various terms into real units (in terms of X0). Notice that the relevant
quantity change in the money market is the change in real balances Am,
which in our analysis is implemented by a change in the price level9 (F)
Suppose that we start with initial equilibrium with no revenue needs
(go). In such a case tof - 1and M1. Consequently,
we start with no distortions related to trade in goods and assets, and with
initial distortion in the money market proportional to the money interest
rate. The source of this distortion is the absence of interest payments on
money, resulting in positive opportunity cost of using an asset whose
"production" is free. Thus, we expect a marginal deadweight loss associated
with raising revenue via small tariffs and the effective use of' tax on capital
inflows, because initial distortions are absent in those markets.° This does
not hold, however, if revenue is raised via an inflation tax, because of the
presence of the initial distortion. Any further increase in revenue needs
(A g >0)is associated with a further rise in taxes on trade in goods and
assets (A t > 0, A (f -1)>0) ,raisingthe marginal deadweight loss
associated with the revenue. At some positive revenue level, we will reach a
point at which the marginal deadweight loss of a tariff or a tax on capital
will match that associated with activating the inflation tax. From that stage
on, we will make use of all means of taxation. Consequently, for large enough
revenue needs, we expect to observe a positive correlation between government
revenue and all sources of taxation. For small revenue needs, we will not use
the inflation tax, or a tax on activities that are distorted in the initialzero revenue equilibrium (go).
If we assume zero cross elasticities, we obtain a version of the Ramsey





wheren corresponds to the elasticities of demandwith respect to the tax
rate (See Appendix A for derivation of eq. 24) This result impliesthat the
tax rate in each market will be positively associated with the elasticityof
demand in the other market, and negatively associated with its own elasticity
of demanth
3.Restrictive Policies and Exchange Rates
The purpose of' this section is to study the effects of the various
policies on the path of the exchange rate, on the premiumassociated with
financial rates, and on goods prices. Let us first specialize the discussion
by looking at the Cobb—Douglas utility:
(25) log X0 +log Y0 +ylog +p[ log X +Blog Y1+ y log
where +B 1 ,andL(v)
We denote by the aggregate resource constraint imposed on the economy:
0 1 1
(26) *+ * * i+r
2 corresponds to the net present value of endowment. The problemof a—15—
typical consumer is to maximize his own welfare (equation 25) subject to his
budget constraint (equation 9). The corresponding first order conditions are
given by:
(27) a.1p -xp
x Ix,o x,o o o
b. ——- —-- P A P
Yo to Y,O
c. — P ]x£ P
I x,1 x1
d, -+-- x £ p
1
1 1
e. ——X(1—c) , Xe
o 1
Equations 27 a-d can be rearranged to yield:





Equations 28 a—b tie the demand for goods to expenditure in a Cobb-Douglas
fashion. We denote by R the implicit nominal interest rate defined by the
traded bond: one monetary unit purchases
jD bondsin period o, which
y,o
will pay [,,.] P1
(1+r*) in monetary units of period 1. Thus:
y,o
p *
(29) 1÷R y,1(1--r )
1
y,o—16—
Using the first order conditions (Equations27—28) yields
(30) a. v1 b. v1(
o y 1+R 1 y
I
c. R d. / I p
p i÷R o
e. c
where p denotes the rate of monetary expansion (1 +p M1/M0) Equations 30
a -bcorrespond to the velocity of circulation. The velocityin period zero
depends positively on the nominal interest rate,which measures the
opportunity cost of using money balances.It depends negatively on the
relative importance of leisure, (y) ,reflectingthe underlying trade-off
between real balances andleisure.12 The money interest rate, in turn, is
proportional to the anticipated rate of monetary expansion(30c). The
intertemporal distribution of consumption, given by 30d,is determined by the
subjective discount factor, p
Consumers are price takers, and in order to solve for equilibriumprices
we should apply equilibrium quantities tothe various budget constraints. We
proceed by solving first for the premium f-i.Let us denote by 01 the
private sector's real income in period 1; 0 q1 ÷B(1+r) .Thisis the
sum of the endowment and the bonds purchasedin period zero. Notice that from




Using first-order conditions one can rewrite 31 as:
—— ye --
A p i—c y,i-17-
Aggregate budget constraint (equation 18) can be written as:
(32) I —tP'Y +I P' (i- —.—) 0 y,o 01 1YO
q0
Using first-order conditions, we obtain that
(32') [1 —Ja. B+P'2—s—)
q0
Equations 31' and can be solved for I and A Direct solution
reveals that
(33) f 1( 1€
z [1 —
01 where z * .zis a measure of the inberterporal allocation
(1+r ) (2 -—-)
q0
of resources faced by the private sector. Authorities affect that allocation
by their revenue target g and the allowed net purchase of foreign bonds.
For a given revenue target, a larger B is associated with a consumption
profile more tilted to the future. To better understand the determination
of f ,notethat a policy of no capital control will generate f1
Equation 33 can be applied to solve for the corresponding value of z in
the absence of capital controls (denoted by z1):
1 -
1)lI\ — 1—y y l—E ktJ Z1- t 1 — • B+p
Usingequation 30 we find that-18-
2 [1- L1 2 [
l—i 1+ji -1— pR
(3, Zf_ t
1— ÷ P 1- ÷ P
Inthe absence of capital controls, the higher the subjective weightof
future consumption (p)themore consumption tilts towards the future A
higher nominal interest rate increases thecost of present consumption,
because it increases the cost of using the money balancesneeded to support
that consumption. Consequently, a higher nominal interestrate encourages
future consumption.Anticipated liberalization of commercial policy
(higher t in period zero) is associated with a largerconsumption bias
towards the future (z /at) Combining equation 33 and 34 we find that, in





The premium of the financial exchange rate is proportional to the degree
to which capital controls introduces a bias towards present consumption
(relative to the case of no capital controls). The factorof proportionality
rises with the weight attached to future consumption (q)andwith the
magnitude of the anticipated commercial liberalizationwhich is equal to the
tariff rate at period zero (t). Notice that the effect of increasing capital
inflows (dB>o) is to reduce the premium, due to their positive effect on z
It is useful to obtain a measure of real interest rates from the following
definitions:
1+R





Using equation 29 we find that:




where itand itrepresentforeign inflation in terms of goods
y and x .Noticethat real interest rates are negatively related to the
financial premium, and that anticipated commercial liberalization would
increase the relevant interest rate. We can solve now for all prices.
Applying equations 31' and 27f we find that:
(38) [1 -Pq P1
Applying equations 38, 8 and 30 we find that:
* Mp(l+t)(l÷r*) (R -_1)
(39)a. P0 (1+r
yf01(1+R)
P H p(i+r*) -




y f01 q (i+R)
A rise in money balances in periodi would result in an equa—proportion
rise in all prices in period i .Highernominal interest rates, associated
with a higher rate of printing money, (dLl>o) would increase prices in period
zero. This reflects the drop in the demand for money consequent upon the
higher opportunity cost of using money. Next, by applying equations 8 and 30,
we obtain that inflation in terms of goods y is-20-
(39) c. -1 f —1+- t-r
y,o
Inflation rises with the anticipated rate of money growth,and drops with






The financial exchange rate is fe0 .Inspectionof equation
39d reveals that tighter capital controls (dB<o)would have opposite effects
on the commercial and financial exchangerates. Their imposition would
de
appreciate the commercial rate, and depreciatethe financial rate (>O
dfe
dB<O) This is because tightercapital controls would tilt the consumption
profile towards that of period zero, thereby raisingthe demand for money, and
consequently would appreciate the commercial exchangerate. The direct effect
of tight capital controls is to increase the premium on foreignassets (df>o)
consequently depreciating the financial rate.
To clarify the determinations of prices and the exchange rate,it is
useful to represent P and ein terms of the net wealth of the private
y,o 0
sector, 2- .Wedo so by applying the first—order conditions given by
q0
equations 28c, 30a to Eq. 32', yielding:
(39a')yo= Ho
(1+t)[1 - + —--J/ [ — _g1-21-
and
(39d') e [1 — + —f"
Equation39a' implies that higher private real wealth would reduce prices
and appreciate the exchange rate, because it would increase the demand for
money. For a given private real wealth policies that tilts the consumption
profile towards the present would have a similar effect, i.e., a lower tariff
(dt<o) and tighter capital controls in period zero (df>o) would reduce
P .Notethat a lower tariff would affect P via two distinct y,o y,o
channels: direct price effect, and intertemporal consumption reallocation
effect. Both effects, however, are working in the same direction, reducing
P
y,o
4. Commercial Policy and Capital Controls as Alternative Means of Achieving
Policy Targets.
In the previous sections we analyzed the case in which distortive
policies were used as a means of raising taxes. Consider now an environment
in which the only policy objective is to affect the allocation of
consumption. The purpose of this section is to assess the comparative
advantages of commercial policy versus capital controls in achieving the
allocative target. In order to focus on those issues, it is useful to proceed
by assuming that there is zero net government revenue, and that the government
distributes its revenue from the various policies in a lump-sum manner.
Contrasting this section to section 3 will provide useful insight into the
effect of non—lump-sum policies. As we shall show, prices and quantities are
affected considerably when we assume redistribution of government gross
proceeds. --22-
We preserve the assumptions regarding preferences givenby equation 25.
We should adjust, however, all the budgetconstraints so as to reflect the
presence of lump-sum distribution. First,we should add to the private budget
constraints (equations 6 and 7) the proceeds from transfers,given for the
aggregate by:
(140) T M —÷tYF' +(f-1)BP'
o00 0 y,O y,O
(141) T1 H1 —H0.
By their nature, lump—sums transfers donot affect marginal behavior.
Thus, equations 27-30 still hold. The aggregatebudget constraints, however,
change. Thus we add the net present valueof transfers to equation 9:
(142) +ci P + + cP —H(1—c)H c +T÷cT
o 1 x,o 0 o x,11o 1 a 1
Applying equations 110-4lweget
(J42')I +cI P ÷cP ÷t YP' ÷(f—1)BP'
o 1 x,o 1 x,1 1 0,O y,O
Thus, the aggregate private budget constraintis free now from monetary
terms, because monetary terms representtransfers that cancel out. Following
steps similar to those in section 2, wefind that
*
* q0 *







The "distortion free" intertemporal budget constraint isnot affected,only now go .Followingthe steps described in section 3 we find that the
premium f is now given by:
0
p(l—z) 1
(33 ) f ,wherez = * ( t\ (1÷r )c z
Comparison of the case of no revenue needs (33') to the case of revenue
needs (33) reveals that the main difference is that f is now free from terms
that relate to the demand for money (such as y and ) Notice that
equation 33 collapses to 33' for y +o The reason is that once all
seigniorage is transferred back, inflation does not affect the goods endowment
of the private sector. In section 3 higher inflation was a tax that affected
net endowment. Those effects were responsible for the presence of y and
in equation 33.In the absence of capital controls z is given by
(314') z1=1 - +p
Again eq. 314' can be obtained from eq. 314 when y ÷o.Followingthe
process described in section 3, we find that prices are now given by:
M
(38') P 1 (1—y)
y,l 01
*





Mp (1+r ) R (l—y)
b. P *
yf 01q0(1÷R)
Notice that the effect of the absence of net tax revenue is that prices
in period two are now independent of the inflation in period zero. In section3, past inflation entered prices in period1 via its negative effect on net
endowment. This effect is absent in the case where go
For a given set of policies, one can apply all thefirst-order conditions
and equation 33' to equation 25, yielding a measureof the welfare level of a
typical consumer:
(1t3) U C (c2) -ylog(i-c) +(1+p)log
1 -Z -log (1+t) -plogf
1---
1 +t
C is a constant term, that depends on the level of theinitial endowment
()
We can use U tp assess the optimal design of policiesaimed at
achieving a given policy target. Without the presenceof such policy targets,
welfare is optimized by f1, to. Thus, in the absenceof revenue or other
policy objectives, free trade in assets and goodsis optimal. We will
consider two types of policy targets. First let us supposethat the policy
maker wishes to restrict imports in period zero. Next,let us consider the
case in which the policy maker wishes to affectthe intertemporal allocation
of consumption.
Case a Imports target:
In the absence of restrictions on free trade, imports are equalto:
(J4)F B10
o P 14-Q y,o




Suppose the policy maker wishes to lower importsto c0 ,c0<
1
Let us find the optimal combination of tariffs Ct)and capital tax (f—i)-25-
capable of achieving such a target. Notice that because inflation does not
affect the allocation of consumption of goods, we cannot reach the imports
target by changing the inflation rate. Thus, our optimization should be
carried out only for f and t .Letus now derive the implication of our
policy target. First, application of' Eq. 28b yields that, subject to
,F, 000
(145) (1÷t) P' c
y,o ol÷q 0
Wecan go on to apply a modified version of Eq. 32 yielding:
(146) !.I[1
Using equation 28c, we find that:
P 2 I [1 +
y,o o 1+t f
Combining equations 145 and 46' we obtain that following a policy of
limiting imports to c0y0F imposes the following restriction:
(4'7\ -(1—z) (l+p)
\ C0(1+t)(1 ——s--- e) 1+t
Optimal policies are chosen by:
(48) Max 0
f,t
s.t. equations 33' and 47
which yield:
(1—c ) (l+p) - 0 -
(149) t ; r 1; zZF c(l-i-p—)
where -refersto optimal policies.
Thus, to achieve the import target we would use a tariff alone. Notice-26-
that -
2
The "optimal" tariff is non—linear with
C c0 (l+p —
respectto the target, increasing at an accelerating rate as C0 drops.
Case b Chaning the intertemporal allocation of consumption:
suppose that the





Subject to free trade, this ratio is ---Supposethat the policy maker




Usingfirst-order conditions we find that
2. (i.L. - .J/ , 8,—
p 1+t l+p
y,o
Combining equations 46' and 51' yields:
(52) (1+p)(1— 8) I [1— + —11
Consequently,optimal policies are chosen by:
(53) Max U
s.t. equations 33' and 52.
Direct optimization yields:
(54) Eo 1 —---— ,
— 1 (—1)
Thus, the policy maker who wishes to tilt consumptiontowards the present




As inthe case of the tariff, the behavior of the premium is highly non—
linear, increasing at an accelerating rate as• p + 1-28-
5. Concluding Remarks
This paper demonstrates the complementary of capital controls,commercial
policy, and inflation taxes as meansof revenue collecting It demonstrates
that we would tend to avoid activating an inflationtax for small revenue
needs. Capital controls considered in the paper arein the form of' an
implicit tax on capital inflow, which isconsistent with either a version of a
two—tier exchange rate or a direct tax on capitalinflow. It should be noted
that the practical application of the various distortive policieswould depend
upon the spectrum of alternative revenueraising tools. In the absence of a
well-developed tax structure, (including, for instance,income and consumption
taxes) a country might make intensive use of commercial policy,capital
controls, and inflation taxes as revenue devices.In an economy with a well
developed tax system, we would expect more extensive applicationof more
traditional taxes.13
Alternative forms of complementarity between inflation taxesand capital
controls would occur in the presence of currency substitution,thus eroding
the inflation tax base.In such a case, capital controls would also be
applied in an attempt to reduce the use of for2ign currencyas a menas of
payment.
While the details of the analysis described in this paper aremodel
specific, the general point should be model-free:The absence of lump-sum
taxes generates complementarity between variousdistortive policies applied to
generate a given revenue at the lowest welfarecost. This complementarity
would not hold, in general, if the purpose of the distortive policieswere to
achieve a given allocative goal.Appendix A
The purpose of' this appendix is to describe the stepsleading to the
reduced-form equation of the welfare loss that results frommarginal change in
government policies {d(M1, B, t)] . Westart by applying the various first..
order conditions (equations 20, 20' and 22') to the expression for thechange
in utility (equation 21). We do so in order toexpress all changes in terms
of observable prices:
*M(1) (Al) — AX+Y(l+t) q — XP U 0 0 0 IP 0 X,O X 0 X,0 0
M (1—c) P P AM
YAP +tXcx,1+AYc j1 ÷
1
IP oy,o 1P 1P P 0 x9o x,o x,o x1o
cM Y cMX
—AP 11 — AP
y,1 IP x,1 IP
1x,o 1 xo
In deriving the terms corresponding to the effects of changingprices
(all the negative terms in(A1)), we make use of equations 20' and 22. For
example:
Aup tJ X0 U (M0) M (1-c)M x x,o-0 -0 -—X(1—c)2- — °
/
U UM UIM o xPI o P I x xoX 00 X,o0 X,00 0 0 0
Defining s ;s as the consumption share of goods x and y in x,1 y,1
period i (s X. P / I.) and using the definition of c,wecan x,11 X,1 1
rewrite (Al) as
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We apply A7 to A8, yielding:
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where m. M1/ P,denotingreal balances in period i
Notice that go implies that f1 andM1 M
.Thus,the last term
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The policy applied by the government has the effect of increasing i,
withoutaffecting M Using standard specification for the demand
for moriey,such a policy would tend to
raise prices in period 1 such that P1. Thus, it would have neglible
effects on m1, and it would affect m0, via its price effect, induced due to
higher anticipated inflation which would, in turn, tend to reduce the demand
for money in period o. Thus, to simplify exposition we presumed that m1 -o.
Next, notice that
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where ir'is defined by r' (P /P' )— 1.In the last
y y y,ly,O
approximation in (A13) we use the fact that around g=o, f is close to 1.
Using these observations we rewrite equation (A12') into its finalform:1




Starting with initial equilibrium withgo, Section 2 demonstrates
that we will raise revenue by activating tariff and capital controls. Let
and BF denote equilibrium values of and B corresponding to
go (where f1 and tzo). Assuming no cross effects, we find that small
f—i and t would raise revenues of
(A15)g zq[t +(f—1)B]
q* [t F1 - +(f_l)BF(i f_1)J
Inderiving (A15) we use the fact that Y (i t
B 'B(1(f_1)nB,f_i) where a,b stands for the elasticity of a with
respect to b. The corresponding deadweight loss can be found by integrating
* F F AY t q +AB(f-
i)q0along a path raising Yto Y0 and B to B,




For a given g, we can find optimal combinations of t and f-i by




which is a version of Ramsey's rule.- 3L —
AppendixB
The appendix summarizes the notation used in the paper
L Leisure
X consumption of expostables
Yconsumptionof importables
B traded bond
foreign price of good z in periodi(z x, y)
et
the exchange rate applied for commercial transactions
(defined as the domestic currency price of foreign
currency).
f—i the wedge between financial and commercial exchange rate
(i.e., fe, is thefinancial exchange rate in period
zero).
foreign interest rate
the domestic price of good z in periodi(zx,y)
the domestic, pre—tariff price of good y
(i.e., (i+t)
endowment of good x in period I
initial money balances in period zero
discount factor
Money expenditure in period i
q, international terms of trade




theelasticity of x with respect to y
P
it - 1 inflation in terms of good
y,o-35
Footnotes
1. For a related study, see Helpman and Sadka (1979). They analyze the
optimal finance of a government budget in a closed economy
considering taxation, bond issuance and money creation as alternative
means of financing.
2. For a related study, see Dornbusch and Frenkel (1973), They model
the exchange activity to highlight the issue of inflation and growth,
where the exchange of goods is facilitated by money balances, labor
and capital. Such a model was applied in an open economy context by
Greenwood (1983).
3. Such a specification was applied by Aizenman (1983) to describe a
theory of a current account and exchange rate determination in a
distortion -freeeconomy. Alternative formulations of the
transaction use of money are applied by using Clower's constraint.
In the context of an open economy, see for example Helpman 11981],
Helpman and Razin [1982], Greenwood and Kimbraugh (19814).
14.We assume that only domestic money is used in co-ordinating domestic
transactions. The underlying structure of the economy described here
is that of a centralized market only in the case of financial
transactions (bonds) and for the exchange of goods and bonds across
borders. There is no centralized exchange of goods among domestic
consumers. The asymmetry between financial transactions and the
domestic exchange of goods among consumers is reflected in the
specification of velocity of money, which is defined only for
transactions that involve consumption.—36—
5. We consider the case of a temporary tariff to allow usevaluation of
the intertemporal substitution introduced by anticipation of atariff
liberalization. Allowing for a uniform tariff in both periods would
eliminate this effect, without affecting the results of our analysis
regarding the nature of the complementarity of the various policies.
6. It should be noted that in the context of capital controls the forms
of the technology of exchange is of crucial importance. For example,
the work by Greenwood and Kimbrough (1981) assumes a Clower
constraint applied separately to domestic and foreign goods when
foreign currency is needed to purchase foreign goods. They showthat
under these conditions foreign exchange controls act like quota on
imports. This result would not hold in our case. Here we assume
that capital controls are applied to purchases of traded bonds, and
that there is a centralized exchange of goods across borders, and
that domestic exchange is using only domestic money.
7. In general, if the initial endowment includes B0 bonds, netincome
would be calculated on the net inflow of capital
(f—i) P' (B —B).
y,o 0
8.Our economy is a modified flexible two-tier regime, under which
authorities have the flexibility to alter the existing stock of
foreign assets available to the public. This process is similiarto
an open market operation in traded bonds.
9. As is shown in Appendix A, there is another term that correspondsto
Am1
using standard specifications for the demand for money this
term is insignificant.
10. We assume also that the cross effects ofAB or At on inare
0
negligible.-37-
11. This assumption simplifies exposition, Assuming a general L would
not affect the results (assuming an internal solution).
12. Notice that v1 does not depend on the interest rate, because 1 is
the terminal period. In a general k-period model, a typical
velocity would have the form v v. (R1), --0, where
R.R. (i)} >0.
13. This suggests that liberlization attempts should be approached in
the context of the capacity of the government to replace restrictive
trade policies used as means of collecting revenue with alternative
sources of funds (oralternatively, liberalization attempts should
accompany a drop in government activities). For a related discussion
see Frenkel (1983).
14. Similiar forms have been applied in the context of real models for
the analysis of distortive policies, See, for example Jones (1979)
and Bhagwati and Ramaswami (1963).References
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